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C O M M E N TA RY

Ineffective Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases and the Promise of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence
Michael L. Perlin, Esq
It is absolutely essential to consider the abject ineffectiveness of counsel in a significant number of
death penalty cases involving defendants with serious mental disabilities and how such ineffectiveness
is often (scandalously) accepted by reviewing courts. We must also assess all of the concerns raised
in this excellent paper by Hiromoto and colleagues through the filter of therapeutic jurisprudence
as a way to guide counsel to thoroughly investigate all aspects of such cases (especially those involving defendants with PTSD) and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the fact finders in the
sorts of cases the authors are discussing.
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The authors of this excellent article conclude, “It is
our belief that achieving systemic justice for capital
defendants lies in ensuring an immensely thorough
and thoughtful mitigation investigation regarding
trauma history. Without this, concerns regarding the
arbitrariness of the death penalty will persist” (Ref 1,
p 11). And I agree completely with their position.
But having said that, I will share some thoughts as
to both the trials of cases involving death-eligible
defendants with potential posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) claims, and the ways that such cases are
resolved by appellate courts, in the hopes of adding
another layer to this complex problem.
I do not think we can overstate the scandal that is
at the heart of this entire area of law. Federal appellate
courts, in construing habeas corpus petitions of this
cohort of defendants who have been sentenced to
death, have ignored the (admittedly) pallid standard
of Strickland v. Washington2 in inevitably affirming
convictions and death sentences in cases where counsel did, by any objective standard, an utterly
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inadequate job.3,4 As two co-authors and I recently
noted in an analysis of all Fifth Circuit Strickland
cases involving defendants with serious mental disabilities who had been sentenced to death, the
decisions were “bizarre and frightening” (Ref. 3,
p 308). There, we said, “In virtually all cases,
Strickland
errors—often, egregious errors—were ignored,
and in over a third of the cases in which they were
acknowledged, defense counsel had confessed
error” (Ref. 3, p 308, emphasis in original). We
concluded that this cohort of cases was “an embarrassment to our system of criminal law and procedure”
(Ref. 3, p 309). This is a sad re-articulation of what
Federal Judge David Bazelon wrote nearly a half-century ago: that so many lawyers representing defendants with mental disabilities were “walking
violations of the Sixth Amendment” (Ref. 4, p 2).
Hiromoto and colleagues acknowledge the substandard job done in many of the cases they address,
but it is critical to acknowledge how substandard
counsel frequently is. I offer here some thoughts on
the article that may supplement the important points
they make.
They are absolutely correct when they focus on the
“fear of faking” of PTSD symptoms (Ref. 5, p 581),
although we have known for years that “the use of
new neuroscience techniques in the development of
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external measures of assessment should obviate most
of these concerns” (Ref. 6, p 460–61; see also Ref. 7).
What needs emphasis here is how most criminal
defense attorneys have historically completely avoided
introducing PTSD, for fear of negative jury response,
as an explanation for why a client with wartime experience may have acted violently toward others or
engaged in other illegal activities.8
They are similarly correct when they note that, in
cases such as Wiggins v. Smith,9 the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of the introduction of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the death penalty case. Subsequent research surveying lower court
decisions both before and after Wiggins, however, indicated that capital defendants did not achieve any
greater success in obtaining relief after Wiggins than
they did before Wiggins.10 As Professor John Blume
and a colleague have noted ruefully, “[d]espite the
Supreme Court’s clear message, a number of courts still
remain hostile to ineffective assistance of counsel claims
and are still willing to put a judicial stamp of approval
on appallingly inadequate representation” (Ref. 11, pp
159–60).
The focus on Porter v. McCollum12 is important,
but it is also necessary to consider the impact of
Porter on subsequent cases via its failure to “acknowledge the reality of mental illness” in death penalty
cases (Ref. 13, p 926). Porter explicitly “places a
burden on the defense bar to ascertain clients’ military
background and subsequent related issues when
defending them in capital cases” (Ref. 14, pp 77–78);
a review of post-Porter litigation tells us that this, simply, is not the norm. As I have noted recently, “many
[lower federal courts] have simply ignored all the
post-Strickland decisions that seemed to have resuscitated at least a partially-sound adequacy of counsel
standard” (Ref. 3, p 278).
The authors are exactly correct when they say,
“Moreover, courts also seem skeptical that mental
health evidence, even if it should have been looked
into, would have made a difference in capital mitigation
cases” (Ref. 1, p 7). I question how courts would know.
There is no metric by which a court can decide that evidence that had not been presented to the trial court
would not have made a difference in jury deliberations.
This is an utter impossibility, and this entire line of inquiry deserves far more attention from both legal and
mental health scholars than has been paid previously.
Hiromoto and colleagues’ point that an expert is
also a teacher (“an expert can help teach lay people
2

about PTSD” (Ref. 1, p 7) is a very important one.
The late Robert Sadoff, MD, a former president of
the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, wrote
and lectured about this extensively,15 and I would
have liked to have seen even more on this point.
When the authors appropriately say, “Defenseretained forensic psychiatrists need to evaluate data . . .”
(Ref. 1, p 8), they again are absolutely right. But
this admonition should apply also to all defense
mental health experts, including, importantly, forensic psychologists.
This sentence puzzles me: “A forensic expert ideally
maintains an objective or neutral stance toward the
defendant” (Ref. 1, p 8). Think about the utter lack
of objectivity exhibited by witnesses such as James
Grigson (the infamous “Doctor Death”)16 or witnesses who have fraudulently testified to the use of
“ethnic adjustments” in distorting the IQ scores of
intellectually disabled defendants at death penalty
trials.17–19 I have written elsewhere about what I have
characterized as “the fallacy of the impartial expert,”20
per the position of Dr. Bernard Diamond,21 and I
think this point might be noted here.
Similarly, I am puzzled by this sentence: “Forensic
psychiatrists may find providing testimony regarding
the effects of trauma in the mitigation phase more
palatable as they are not tasked with vehemently
defending their conclusions, as in criminal responsibility testimony” (Ref. 1, p 9). Any time forensic
experts take the stand they must be prepared to vehemently defend their conclusions, especially in a death
penalty case. I was hoping for an explanation here.
The authors refer to the “floodgates” rationale:
“There is a real concern that a focus on the traumatic
backgrounds of individuals involved in criminal cases
might open the floodgates for nearly every defendant
to claim a traumatic history as a reason for leniency”
(Ref. 1, p 9). This is troubling for two reasons: First,
the reality is that most defendants have no expert witness (as over 90% are indigent, and there are rarely
adequate funds available for those with the level of expertise needed to make these arguments),17 and, as
discussed above, the level of counsel is so substandard
that this is not likely at all. Second, this is an argument raised every time there is any development in
the law that evens the playing field so as to make the
proceedings fairer to defendants. Professor Blume
and his colleagues have analyzed this carefully in
the context of Atkins claims, concluding that “Atkins
has not opened floodgates of nonmeritorious
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litigation” (Ref. 22, pp 627–28). A comprehensive
analysis of the Supreme Court’s often-expressed “fear
of floodgates” argues for a presumption against courtcentered floodgates arguments. It is, simply, (or at
least, should be) a nonissue.23
The discussion of the American Bar Association
(ABA) guidelines may need some clarification (the
authors suggest it is “unclear” whether the guidelines
are “aspirational or essential.” They are clearly essential. The guidelines “made clear the absolute requirement that capital defenders retain the assistance of a
mitigation specialist as an essential member of any
defense team” (Ref. 24, p. 770); they are not merely
aspirational, but, rather, were developed to “reflect
prevailing professional norms” (Ref. 25, p 1078).
There can no longer be any question but that “a rich
understanding of the complexities of psychological
trauma is crucial for the development and presentation of mitigation evidence related to exposure to
traumatic events” (Ref. 26, p 926).
The authors’ final conclusion is such an important
one, in which they urge courts to “more readily
appoint consultants to defense teams to interpret
potentially mitigating evidence” (Ref. 1, p 11). In a
recent article, I have argued that there are cases in
which multiple experts may be needed: one to
evaluate the defendant and one to explain to the factfinders why their “ordinary common sense” (a psychological construct that reflects the level of the disparity between perception and reality that regularly
pervades the judiciary in deciding cases involving
individuals with mental disabilities; Ref. 27, p 365,
n. 127) is flawed.28.I define “ordinary common sense”
as a self-referential and nonreflective way of constructing the world (“I see it that way, therefore everyone
sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that’s the
way it is”; Ref. 29, p 253, n. 78). The authors’ point
here is precisely the one that I sought to make.
There are two other points for me to make. First, I
think it is absolutely essential that lawyers and expert
witnesses engage in this sort of work study and absorb
the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence as part of
their work. Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) recognizes
that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.30 It asks
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can
or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic
potential while not subordinating due process principles.31 Professor David Wexler clearly identifies how
the inherent tension in this inquiry must be resolved:

the law’s use of “mental health information to
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge
upon justice concerns” (Ref. 32, p 21). Therapeutic
jurisprudence “look[s] at law as it actually impacts
people’s lives” (Ref. 33, p 535), and supports “an
ethic of care” (Ref. 34, pp 605-07).
As stated flatly by Judge Juan Ramirez and
Professor Amy Ronner, “the right to counsel is . . .
the core of therapeutic jurisprudence” (Ref. 35,
p 119). “Any death penalty system that provides inadequate counsel and that, at least as a partial result of
that inadequacy, fails to insure that mental disability
evidence is adequately considered and contextualized
by death penalty decision-makers, fails miserably from
a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective” (Ref. 36,
p 1542). If counsel in death penalty cases fails to meet
constitutional minima, it strains credulity to argue
that such a practice might comport with TJ principles.
In so many death penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities, counsel fails miserably
to abide by therapeutic jurisprudence principles, leading our entire system to “fail . . . miserably” from this
TJ perspective (Ref. 37, p 235). I believe attention
must be paid to our legal system’s abject failures here.
Second, in a previous article about PTSD and veterans returning from war in Iraq and Afghanistan, I
considered how PTSD was dealt with in a full array of
federal sentencing considerations and concluded with
these recommendations, one that I think complement
the ones made by Hiromoto and colleagues:
Courts must “get” the significance of the
expanded PTSD definition in DSM-5 (Ref. 13,
pp 917–18).
Fact finders must understand how experiences of
soldiers in current wars may have been dramatically different from what their “ordinary common
sense” has led them to believe is how soldiers
“should have reacted” to battlefield conditions
(Ref. 13, p 905). Parenthetically, for those whose
PTSD came from different sources than war injuries, fact-finders would have to re-structure their
thinking so as to not impose such “should have
reacted” beliefs on, by way of example, abused
women or refugees from war zones.
Fact finders must, finally, acknowledge how sanist thinking has distorted their decision-making
in this area. For those unfamiliar with the term,
sanism is “an irrational prejudice of the same
quality and character of other irrational
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prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia
and ethnic bigotry” (Ref. 36, p 1507, n. 19).
Fact finders must embrace TJ as a “redemptive”
means of “stripping bare the law’s sanist façade”
of such decision-making (Ref. 38, p 591).
Lawyers need to understand the vocabulary and
techniques of these new rehabilitative approaches.
Judges, lawyers and all those who interact with
the criminal justice system or defendants with
PTSD need to understand the true consequences of failing to acknowledge the impact of
PTSD, and the contingent benefits (lowering
recidivism rates, enhancing behavioral changes)
of actually putting into context the PTSD considerations (Ref. 13, pp 926–27).
I think it is vital to explicitly articulate, from a TJ
perspective, the burden on counsel to thoroughly
investigate all aspects of such cases and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the fact finders in the
sorts of cases the authors are discussing. I believe that
would be the most likely way for the changes the
authors seek to come about.
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